Download PDF by Christopher Bobonich, Pierre Destrée (eds.): Akrasia in Greek Philosophy. From Socrates to Plotinus

By Christopher Bobonich, Pierre Destrée (eds.)

ISBN-10: 9004156704

ISBN-13: 9789004156708

The thirteen contributions of this collective provide new and not easy methods of examining recognized and extra missed texts on akrasia (lack of keep an eye on, or weak point of will) in Greek philosophy (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Plotinus).

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Additional info for Akrasia in Greek Philosophy. From Socrates to Plotinus (Philosophia Antiqua 106)

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E. , using intellectualist premises). g. Fine (2003). See Rowe (2005). a problem in the GORGIAS 23 Given all of this, the dialogues in question15 will still tend naturally to fall into two groups—not, now, by the Aristotelian (metaphysical) criterion, but rather according to whether they (a) presuppose, explore, or otherwise make use of, or alternatively (b) reject or ignore this (apparently) Socratic theory. 17 If it is true that there are ‘intellectualist’ dialogues, on the one hand, and ‘non-intellectualist’ (or ‘anti-intellectualist’) dialogues on the other, the easiest hypothesis seems to be that Plato began by thinking the Socratic position powerful, and central (for in numerous dialogues it is central), but later came to think differently, and to suppose that he needed a different line, one that would improve on, make good what he had come to see as the defects of, the original Socratic account of human action.

12 But all such maneuvers to save the traditional understanding of Socratic intellectualism about motivation are severely undermined by a passage in the Charmides: argue that only pleasure has the power to appear good. See Irwin (1977), 102–115; and 1995, 81–92. Other traditionalists may argue that such things as good looks, health, wealth, and so forth have the power to appear good. 8 Santas (1979) argues that our desire is for what we take to be good for us, whereas Penner and Rowe 1994 argue that our desire is for what is really good for us.

7 Traditionalists may differ about how many different kinds of things have the dunamis tou phainomenou. Someone such as Irwin, who believes that Socrates is a hedonist, will 4 thomas c. brickhouse and nicholas d. , Charmides 167e1–5, Meno 77a3–78c2, Gorgias 493a1–b3; Protagoras 340a7–b1) explicitly distinguishes between what he calls boulêsis and epithumia, two of Plato’s and Aristotle’s favorite terms for rational and non-rational desire, respectively. Is not this evidence enough to show that Socrates recognizes two types of desires and thus that the traditionalists are mistaken?

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Akrasia in Greek Philosophy. From Socrates to Plotinus (Philosophia Antiqua 106) by Christopher Bobonich, Pierre Destrée (eds.)

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